The European Union, through its new defense initiative SAFE (Security Action for Europe), is moving toward greater strategic autonomy. Meanwhile, Turkey—an applicant to join SAFE and a long-standing NATO member—finds itself at a critical geopolitical crossroads. In a potential confrontation between Europe and Russia, would Ankara turn against Moscow, or continue to play both sides? This analysis explores Turkey’s strategic options, its ties with Russia and the EU, and the internal and external forces shaping its stance.

SAFE and Turkey: Alliance or Bargaining Chip?

Approved by the European Council in May 2025, SAFE marks the EU’s most ambitious step toward defense autonomy, backed by a €150 billion budget for 2025–2030. The program prioritizes cybersecurity (30%), drone and AI development (25%), weapons production (35%), and research and innovation (10%). Unlike NATO’s Article 5, SAFE does not entail collective defense or joint military operations; instead, it strengthens Europe’s defense industrial base.

Turkey submitted its application in September 2025, triggering objections from Greece and Cyprus over tensions in the Aegean and the occupation of Northern Cyprus. Despite this, Germany, Poland, and Italy support Ankara’s participation, citing Turkey’s strategic location, its large standing army (425,000 active personnel—the second largest in NATO), and its advanced drone manufacturing industry, led by Baykar (maker of the Bayraktar TB2 and Akinci).

For Ankara, joining SAFE appears to be less a commitment and more a diplomatic leverage tool, signaling alignment without full political convergence with Brussels.

Turkey–Russia: Between Cooperation and Competition

Turkey maintains a “co-opetition” relationship with Russia—part cooperation, part rivalry.

  • Energy Dependence: In 2024, 42% of Turkey’s natural gas imports came from Russia via the TurkStream pipeline. Moscow also finances the Akkuyu nuclear plant (4.8 GW, under construction). Russian tourism accounts for roughly 20% of Turkey’s tourism revenue—around $10 billion annually. Meanwhile, Ankara is gradually reducing dependency by expanding renewable energy (15% of consumption in 2025) and developing the Sakarya gas field in the Black Sea, expected to produce 10 bcm per year by 2030.
  • Trade Relations: Bilateral trade reached $62 billion in 2024, with Turkey exporting agricultural and textile goods and importing energy. Turkey has refrained from sanctioning Russia after the invasion of Ukraine, reinforcing its status as a neutral broker.
  • Military Cooperation: Ankara integrated Russian S-400 missile systems into its domestic HAKIM defense network while maintaining NATO’s F-16 fleet and developing homegrown weapon systems. In Syria, it cooperates with Moscow through the Astana Process, but in Libya and the South Caucasus, the two back opposing sides.
  • Geopolitical Rivalry: Ankara diverges from Moscow in Ukraine (providing drones to Kyiv), in Nagorno-Karabakh (supporting Azerbaijan), and in the Black Sea, where Turkey’s control of the Bosporus under the Montreux Convention gives it a key strategic lever.

The Black Sea: Strategic Leverage

Control over the Black Sea and the Straits gives Turkey unique leverage in any future conflict. Ankara could restrict Russian naval movement or allow NATO passage, depending on its interests. The expansion of the Turkish Navy—such as the new Ada-class corvettes—further cements its role as a regional power broker.

Conflict Scenarios: Under What Conditions Would Turkey Fight?

Turkey’s stance would depend on the conflict’s framework:

  1. NATO Article 5 Activation: Legally, Turkey must act if a NATO member is attacked. Yet its historical behavior—such as limited engagement in Libya—suggests a preference for defensive posturing and risk aversion. Public sentiment also constrains interventionism: 60% of Turks oppose foreign military involvement (2024 poll).
  2. Conflict under SAFE: Since SAFE has no military clause, Turkey’s involvement would likely be industrial or technological, supplying drones (up to 300 Bayraktars annually) or support systems. Participation would be largely economic and symbolic.
  3. Direct Threat to National Interests: Should Russia endanger Turkey’s vital interests—such as in the Black Sea or the Caucasus—Ankara might engage militarily. Historically, the two powers have fought 12 wars since the 16th century, with roughly half ending in Ottoman victories. Today, however, Turkey prefers diplomatic mediation over confrontation.

Domestic Politics and Diplomatic Balancing

President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, facing 50% inflation and a lira trading at 35 per U.S. dollar, uses foreign policy to reinforce domestic legitimacy. The opposition CHP accuses him of excessive proximity to Moscow and advocates closer Western alignment. Meanwhile, Turkey continues to position itself as a mediator, as seen in the Ukraine grain export deal (2022–2023).

In the event of a Europe–Russia conflict, Ankara would likely pursue mediation over confrontation, leveraging diplomacy to boost its global standing.

Ankara’s Strategy: Adaptive Opportunism

Turkey’s foreign policy follows a pattern of “adaptive opportunism”—seizing opportunities without full commitment to either the West or Russia. Participation in SAFE reinforces EU ties but does not imply readiness to confront Moscow militarily. Its strategic principle remains: “No permanent allies or enemies—only interests.”

Political Implications and Diplomatic Balancing Acts

Within the EU: Germany and Poland advocate Turkey’s inclusion in SAFE, while Greece and Cyprus oppose it. A potential compromise could grant Ankara limited participation, restricted to technological cooperation.

Within Turkey: The opposition condemns government concessions, while Erdoğan promotes the narrative of Turkey as an independent regional power.

Conclusion

Turkey is unlikely to turn against Russia in a European conflict—unless NATO’s Article 5 is triggered or Turkish strategic interests, particularly in the Black Sea, are directly threatened. Its participation in SAFE strengthens its European ties but remains a negotiating instrument, not a military pledge.

Anchored by its control of the Straits and guided by pragmatic flexibility, Ankara will continue balancing between East and West, seeking mediation over confrontation and prioritizing national interest above alignment.

Published: October 2025 · International Strategy Analysis
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